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n most countries, government surveillance of activities that 
take place in public is not regulated or only lightly regulated. 
Similarly, in most countries police efforts to obtain records of 
everyday transactions usually requires, at most, a finding that the 
record is “relevant” to an investigation. Arguably, these rules 
should change now that technology – cameras, drones, computers, 
and the like – has made both visual surveillance and transaction 
surveillance easier and cheaper. Technology allows creation of 
“panvasive” systems that scan across and record the activities of 
large groups of persons and mining the accumulated data.1  
On the assumption that a new regulatory regime is necessary, this 
paper looks to European law as a model for regulating the 
establishment of panvasive systems, and to American law as a 
model for regulating government targeting of an individual using 
such systems. It argues, following Europe’s lead, that surveillance 
systems may not be established unless they are authorized by 
legislative bodies representative of the affected populace, through 
specific delegations that require mechanisms for overseeing 
implementation of the program, all of which is subject to judicial 
review. It also argues, following suggestions in recent U.S. Supreme 
Court caselaw, for implementation of “mosaic theory” as a way 
calibrating the justification required to target the activities or 
records of a particular individual.  
Because it will facilitate the presentation, this paper discusses issues 
surrounding targeting of particular individuals first, before it 
examines issues relevant to the creation of panvasive systems. 
Thus, the first part of the paper discusses mosaic theory and how 
it might be implemented in a way that meaningfully protects the 
targets of government investigation. The second part addresses 
principles that should govern the establishment of the panvasive 
programs that facilitate such targeting. 
                                                
1 The word “panvasive” refers to investigative programs that are both pervasive and 
invasive, while cutting across large segments of the populace that are largely innocent of 
wrongdoing. See Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 
308 (2013). 
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§ 1 – TARGETED INVESTIGATIONS AND MOSAIC THEORY 
In the 2012 decision of United States v. Jones2 the Supreme Court 
held that month-long tracking using a device planted on a car is a 
“search” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against 
unreasonable searches, and thus (probably3) requires a warrant, 
based on probable cause, before it can occur. The decision was big 
news in the United States for a number of reasons. First, it 
introduced the possibility that surveillance of public spaces is 
governed by the Constitution. Second, it reinvigorated property 
interests as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection, because it 
focused on the fact that the tracking in the case was enabled 
through a trespass on Jones’ car.4 And, of most relevance to this 
paper, it indicated that at least five justices on the Court are willing 
to consider some version of what has come to be called “mosaic 
theory,” as a way of figuring out when government information-
gathering that normally would not be considered a Fourth 
Amendment “search” becomes one. 
The mosaic idea is captured in Justice Alito’s statement, in a 
concurring opinion joined by three other justices, that “relatively 
short-term monitoring” of a person’s movements on public streets 
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment but that “prolonged” 
GPS monitoring does.5 Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurrence 
went further, stating that the question should be “whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits 
and so on.”6 These kinds of statements are said to be an expression 
of a mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment because they 
suggest that, while collecting isolated bits of publicly available 
information is not a constitutionally cognizable “search,” 
accumulation and assemblage of numerous discreet pieces can be, 
because it reveals a fairly good picture about an individual’s 
personal life.7 
We all can intuit that this is true. Following someone for a few 
minutes probably won’t reveal much, but tracking the person for 
28 days, as occurred in Jones, probably will. As the lower court in 
Jones stated: 
                                                
2 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
3 Id.at 954 (explaining that the Court had “no occasion to consider” the government’s 
argument that something less than a warrant based on probable cause would have justified 
the search in Jones).  
4 Id.at 952 (stating that the dominant test for determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment – which focuses on whether a police action infringes “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” – “has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test”). 
5 Id.at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
6 Id.at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
7 The first court to apply this term in the Fourth Amendment context was United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed 
by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, 
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of 
information can each reveal more about a person than does any 
individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a 
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as 
does one's not visiting any of these places over the course of a 
month. The sequence of a person's movements can reveal still 
more; a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a 
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby 
supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of 
another's travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a 
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an 
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular 
individuals or political groups – and not just one such fact about a 
person, but all such facts.8 
The same can be said for government perusals of records held by 
third parties, such as banks, phone companies, internet service 
providers and credit card agencies. Finding out that an individual 
has made a particular payment, phone call or email communication 
can provide some insight into what a person is up to. But a 
month’s-worth of phone and email logs and credit card data is 
much more likely to reap a gold mine of detail about how one lives 
one’s life.9  
Nonetheless, until Jones, government surveillance of activities in 
public or of daily transactions outside the home was not governed 
by the Fourth Amendment, whether short-term or long-term. 
Technically, the same is still true after Jones, at least when the 
surveillance is not aided by a trespass. But a number of lower courts 
in the U.S. have construed Jones to require a warrant for GPS 
surveillance that is based on cellphone or transponder signals 
obtainable without a trespass,10 and some courts, both before and 
after Jones, have required more than a simple subpoena for 
obtaining certain types of records.11 
                                                
8 Id. See also, Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming, 2015) (arguing that the more information the government gathers about 
individuals, the less anonymous they become, which undermines the right to anonymity). 
9 See Steven M. Bellovin, Renee M. Hutchins, Tony Jebara & Sebastian Zimmeck, When 
Enough is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 556 (2014) (arguing that the science of machine learning concretely 
demonstrates how longer-term data collection enhances predictions about behavior and 
thus allows greater understanding of the person targeted).  
10 Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d, 543, 553 (Mass. 2103); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 
490, 497 (S.Dak. 2012) (holding that putting a GPS device on defendant’s car and tracking 
the defendant was not only a trespass but also infringed his reasonable expectations of 
privacy); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d. 1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) (holding, prior to Jones, that 
“[t]he massive invasion of privacy entailed by the prolonged use of the GPS device was 
inconsistent with even the slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  
11 See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and its State Analog to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable 
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 424-25 (2006) (describing states that require reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to obtain records considered particularly private). 
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At the same time, however, many courts dealing with the tracking 
issue have ignored mosaic theory, despite the invitation of the 
concurring opinions in Jones to do so.12 Rather than gauging 
whether tracking was “short-term” or “prolonged” they simply 
require a warrant for all tracking. The major resistance to the theory 
has not been conceptual, but rather practical. To wit: How is a 
court to figure out when surveillance is “prolonged”? In the record 
context, the analogous question might be, how much 
“aggregation” must occur before the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated? What if the government only tracks a person for a week 
rather than a month, or accesses bank records for two different 
days, separated by a month? As a recent Florida Supreme Court 
opinion put it, mosaic theory “requires case-by-case, after-the-fact, 
ad hoc determinations about whether the length of the monitoring 
crossed the threshold of the Fourth Amendment in each case 
challenged.”13 
The outcome of this worry about implementation could go in one 
of two directions. The first is to declare that the Fourth 
Amendment is usually not applicable in these cases, or at most 
requires a subpoena based on a minimal relevance showing.14 The 
second, endorsed by the post-Jones cases noted above, is to state 
that even minimal surveillance requires a warrant, based on 
probable cause.15  
The problem with the first approach – which is in essence the 
Court’s, outside of the anomalous Jones decision – is that it blinks 
at the privacy invasion and governmental abuse that can be 
associated with suspicionless surveillance. Most of the Court’s 
cases have insisted that we assume the risk that people will see us 
when we go into public spaces and that a third party to whom we 
surrender information will hand that information over to the 
government.16 But that reasoning is bankrupt, both descriptively 
and normatively. Most of us don’t expect to be subject to 
prolonged surveillance or monitoring, either visual or 
                                                
12 United States v. Wilford, 961 F.Supp.2d 740, 771 (D.Md.2013) (noting that “mosaic” 
theory has presented problems in practice); United States v. Graham, 846 F.Supp.2d 384, 
401 (D.Md.2012) (same).  
13 Tracey v. State, 2014 WL 5285929, *14 (Fl. Sup. Ct. 2014).  
14 Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) 
(arguing that, “as a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory” and 
intimating that the author favors a legislative approach).  
15 See cases cited supra note 12. 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (“A person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another [because he]. voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who 
want[s] to look the fact that he [is] travelling over particular roads in a particular direction 
. . . .”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him 
to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will 
not be betrayed.”);  
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transactional.17 Nor should we. As I and others have argued, the 
Fourth Amendment’s promise of “the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches” guarantees both a right to anonymity in 
public18 and a right to expect that third party institutions to which 
we surrender information will use it only for its intended purpose; 
thus, the government should not be able to monitor public 
movements and transactions with banks, phone companies and the 
like without justification.19  
The problem with the second approach – making every act of 
public or transactional surveillance a search requiring probable 
cause – is twofold. First, it often will overestimate the privacy 
invasion; a single location, phone number, or credit charge is 
usually nowhere near as revealing as the invasions that are 
classically associated with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause 
requirement – i.e., ransacking one’s home or eavesdropping on 
phone calls.20 Second, a rule requiring probable cause for every 
search handcuffs law enforcement efforts to develop probable cause. 
Much short-term surveillance and many subpoenas for records are 
designed to get information that will lead to arrest; if the police 
already had probable cause they wouldn’t need the surveillance in 
the first place.21 
Thus, mosaic theory – a middle ground between these extremes – 
makes sense in theory. Moreover, it can be implemented 
effectively, albeit not perfectly. I have suggested the following 
time-delineated scheme.22 For surveillance of public activities that 
lasts longer than 48 hours, probable cause is required. But for 
surveillance that lasts less than 20 minutes, police only need to 
demonstrate a good faith belief that the observation will achieve a 
                                                
17 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 110-113, 180-186 (2007) (describing studies indicating that 
many types of public and transaction surveillance are viewed as more intrusive than 
inspections and frisks that have been held to infringe the Fourth Amendment).  
18 Id.at 90-108; Skopek, supra note 8, at ___ (arguing that the Fourth Amendment right to 
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses a right to anonymity).  
19 SLOBOGIN, supra note 17, at chs. 5 & 7; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation 
of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1167 (2002) (arguing for a regime in 
which, with certain exceptions, “information collected from third party records may only 
be used for the particular purpose for which it is collected”). 
20 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) (stating that application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements to electronic surveillance “is no formality … but a 
fundamental rule that has long been recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in 
America.”). 
21 Nina Totenburg, Do Police Need Warrants for GPS Tracking Devices, NATIONAL PUBLIC 
RADIO, Nov. 8, 2011, available at http://www.npr.org/2011/11/08/142032419/do-
police-need-warrants-for-gps-tracking-devices (quoting former assistant attorney general 
asserting that GPS tracking is a useful device for following up leads necessary to develop 
probable cause); HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, GRAND JURY PRACTICE 5-25 (2005) (noting 
that subpoenas are typically issued “in the context of a preliminary investigation to 
determine whether any wrongdoing has occurred and whether probable cause exists to 
charge any individual with commission of any offense”). 
22 Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance 
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST’L L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 24, 28 (2012). 
 Domestic Surveillance of Public Activities and Transactions with Third Parties: Melding 
European and American Approaches – Christopher Slobogin. 
– 140 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
legitimate law enforcement objective. For surveillance that endures 
longer than 20 minutes but less than 48 hours, reasonable suspicion 
(a lesser justification than probable cause) is required. Similarly, 
obtaining records that reflect activity over more than a 48-hour 
period requires probable cause, but accessing records of activities 
covering a shorter period of time only requires reasonable 
suspicion. Under this rule for records searches, probable cause is 
needed to authorize access to phone or bank records covering 
more than two days (or more than two days apart), or a record of 
medical or purchasing history, while obtaining information about 
a single credit card purchase or headers about a day-long email 
thread is possible on a reasonable suspicion showing.23  
This implementation of mosaic theory is based on what I have 
called a “proportionality theory” of the Fourth Amendment.24 
Proportionality theory already plays a role in the Court’s seizure 
jurisprudence, which allows a detention for up to twenty minutes 
on reasonable suspicion, but requires probable cause for any 
detention beyond that, and a judicial determination of cause if the 
detention lasts more than 48 hours.25 These distinctions between 
seizures are based in part on the idea that a stop is less intrusive 
than an arrest.26 They are also based on the realization that police 
need something short of arrest – an investigatory detention – if 
they are to do their jobs well.27 The same proportionality approach 
is justified in the search context. Otherwise, we are left with the 
extremes: no constitutional regulation at all, or an impossible-to-
meet or very watered-down probable cause standard. 
Of course, durational limits of this sort are arbitrary means of 
delineating privacy protection. But the U.S. Supreme Court 
routinely uses time periods as a prophylactic method of 
implementing the Constitution.28 Good examples come from the 
Court’s decisions, just noted, that declare that individuals who are 
arrested do not need to be brought in front of magistrate unless 
they are held for longer than 48 hours, and that hold that fifteen to 
twenty minutes is the threshold for determining when a detention 
transforms from an investigative stop into a full-blown arrest.29 
                                                
23 Interception of communications would be regulated in the traditional manner, 
requiring probable cause and a warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
24 SLOBOGIN, supra note 17, at 21.  
25 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring a judicial 
determination of probable cause within 48 hours); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
687-88 (1985) (finding a twenty-minute stop reasonable but only because the suspect was 
responsible for some of the delay).  
26 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (“An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion 
upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons”). 
27 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require 
a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to 
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.”) 
28 In addition to the Fourth Amendment rules noted in the text, for instance, the Supreme 
Court has adopted durational rules in the interrogation context. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 
559 U.S. 98, 111 (2010) (holding that police may re-initiate questioning two weeks after a 
suspect requests counsel).  
29 See cases cited supra note 25. 
 Domestic Surveillance of Public Activities and Transactions with Third Parties: Melding 
European and American Approaches – Christopher Slobogin. 
– 141 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
Statutes also often use duration as a dividing point for privacy 
protections. For instance, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act requires a warrant for records held on a server less than 180 
days but only a showing of relevance after that period,30 and Title 
III limits electronic eavesdropping warrants to 30 days.31 In 
Europe, France provides several similar examples. For instance, 
witnesses may be held only for 24 hours without judicial review, 
and detentions for identity checks are limited to four hours.32 All 
of these rules calibrate legal requirements by reference to time 
periods that, in any given case, could be over or under inclusive. 
Indeed, in virtually every area of law, prophylactic rules that 
inexactly effectuate constitutional or legislative intent are common 
and necessary.33  
To facilitate implementation of this time-based implementation of 
proportionality/mosaic theory, I also define probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion with more precision than traditionally has 
been the case. Probable cause is defined as an articulable belief that 
a search will more likely than not produce contraband, fruit of 
crime, or other significant evidence of wrongdoing, whereas 
reasonable suspicion is defined as an articulable belief that a search 
will more likely than not lead to such evidence.34 Note that both 
definitions reference a preponderance standard, which is usually 
associated only with probable cause, not with the less demanding 
reasonable suspicion concept.35 In my scheme, reasonable 
suspicion is still a less demanding justification. But the distinction 
is achieved not by abandoning the more-likely-than-not standard 
for an amorphous lower certainty level, but by expanding the type 
of evidence that may be sought for searches conducted on 
reasonable suspicion, to include not only obvious evidence of 
crime, like contraband, but anything that might lead to such 
evidence, such as locational information, a credit card purchase or 
a phone call.36  
This differentiation between probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion – based on the object of the search rather than on the 
level of certainty that it will be found – provides an additional 
advantage. As one court has recognized, a significant problem 
confronted by courts that impose a probable cause requirement on 
                                                
30 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). 
31 Id.§ 2518(5). 
32 See Richard Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: 
How Do the French Do It, How Can we Find Out, and Why Should We Care? 78 CAL. 
L. REV. 539, 574-575 (1990). 
33 See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 
208 (1988). 
34 Slobogin, supra note 22, at 20-23. 
35 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (“police officer may in appropriate circumstances 
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly 
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”). 
36 See generally Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What? The Importance of 
Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata 
Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725 (2014) (arguing that manipulating the object 
in the way described in the text is the best way to vary justification standards). 
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GPS tracking is that the locational information obtained is not 
evidence of crime, and thus technically cannot be the target of a 
warrant as warrants have traditionally been conceptualized.37 
Similarly, as already noted, always requiring probable cause that 
evidence of crime will be found would prevent the police from 
carrying out routine investigative techniques, like tracking a person 
to see if he consorts with a known suspect, contacting a phone 
company to discover whether he called a suspected co-conspirator 
on the day of the crime, or acquiring store records to find out 
whether he purchased a particular type of gun or an item found at 
the crime scene. The definition of reasonable suspicion outlined 
above allows such searches to take place (within the 48-hour 
limit).38 
My proposal has two other significant components as well. The 
first is a danger exception that allows relaxation of the usual 
justification if necessary to prevent a serious, specified crime.39 This 
exception is based on the idea – well-accepted in Fourth 
Amendment cases40 – that when the goal of government 
intervention is prevention, a somewhat relaxed standard is 
permissible. But this exception would never apply if the police are 
trying to solve a crime that has already occurred, nor would it apply 
unless the crime sought to be prevented is serious and specified. 
 
The second additional component of the proposal addresses an 
issue that few commentators or courts address: when may 
surveillance systems, designed to facilitate targeting of individuals, 
be established? For instance, when may the state install a city-wide 
camera system or a system for monitoring the movements of all 
vehicles? When may it create data collection systems like the 
National Security Agency’s metadata programs exposed by Edward 
Snowden, or the “fusion centers” that fill the same role for local 
law enforcement?41 That is the subject to which we now turn. 
                                                
37 In re Application of the United States, 2011 WL 3423370, *7 (D. Md. Aug 3, 2011). 
38 This definition of reasonable suspicion also allows what I have called “event-based” 
investigation, where the police start off with an event, rather than a suspect. SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 17, at 191-192. Say, for instance, police know a murder occurred at a particular 
location in a park, or that a series of murders with a particular modus operandi occurred 
in a number of cities, or that a bomb will go off in a particular location at a particular 
time. Obtaining cellphone or travel log data to determine who was near these locations 
at the relevant time—the event—could help police zero in on a suspect. While police 
would not have probable cause as defined above, they would have reasonable suspicion 
as I define it, at least if the data collection was narrowly constrained by both time and 
location.  
39 See Slobogin, supra note 22, at 23 (permitting a search “if a reasonable law enforcement 
officer would believe [the search] is necessary to help avert [a serious and specific 
danger].” 
40 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26-27 (“a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may 
arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a 
person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime”). 
41 For a description of the NSA metadata program, see Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA 
Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet”, GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013), 
www.theguadian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data. For a 
description of fusion centers, see CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
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§ 2 – PANVASIVE SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY 
The two concepts introduced so far – a mosaic theory of privacy 
protection that requires proportionately greater justification for 
greater intrusions, and an exception to that rule in cases involving 
a serious and specific danger – have parallels in European law. 
European countries recognize that the concept of proportionality 
is crucial in determining the scope of government’s ability to 
infringe on fundamental rights.42 And Germany, at least, limits data 
mining designed to discover more about persons of interest to 
those situations where the government can demonstrate the mining 
is in response to serious threat.43 But, generally speaking, European 
law is not as well-developed as American law with respect to 
determining when an individual may be targeted by the 
government.44 
In contrast, the European Union has much more attentive, at least 
in theory, to the predicate issue of when a surveillance system or 
program may be created in an effort to collect information that can 
be used to target individuals. In Digital Rights Ireland, 45 the 
European Union Court of Justice held that large-scale retention of 
data infringes several rights guaranteed in the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. It further held that this 
infringement is justified only if the retention is “strictly necessary” 
to fight terrorism, organized crime and other serious crime,46 only 
if justified by a court or an administrative body that is 
implementing legislation,47 and only if the retention is limited 
durationally and securely.48  
The Digital Rights Ireland case sets out a framework, but is not 
specific in its directives. German law provides an example of a 
more specific approach. As Professor Francesca Bignami has 
noted, in Germany, and to a lesser extent other European 
countries, a program that indiscriminately vacuums up information 
about large segments of the domestic population must meet several 
requirements, even in the national security context. In Germany, 
for instance, such a program has to be (1) “authorized by a public 
                                                
FUSION CENTERS, available at http://constitution 
project.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf (hereafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT). 
42 See, e.g., Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 B.H.R.C. 449 para. 43 (May 4, 2000) 
(construing the Council of Europe Convention and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 8).  
43 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Apr. 4, 2006, 1 FVerfGE, para. 158 (requiring an 
“imminent and specific endangerment” of a serious offense, not simply an “abstract 
endangerment”).  
44 For instance, compared to United States law, the warrant and probable cause 
requirements are diluted and exclusion of evidence is a rarity. See Christopher Slobogin, 
Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM’L REG. 
321, 323-26 (2011).  
45 Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-295/12, Digital Rights Irl. Ltd. v. Ministers for Commc’n, 2014 
E.C.R. I-238. 
46 Id. at § 56. 
47 Id. at § 62. 
48 Id. at § 63 & § 66. 
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law or regulation;” (2) “reviewed, in advance, by an independent 
privacy agency” and monitored by that agency “to guarantee that 
the program was being run in accordance with the law’” and (3), as 
noted above, careful to mine the information acquired “only for 
certain statutorily prescribed ‘serious’ threats and, in the case of 
terrorism, only if there [is] an ‘imminent and specific 
endangerment’ from the threat.”49 Further, European law (4) does 
not permit prolonged detention of the data accumulated and (5) 
often permits individuals “to check on their personal data, to 
ensure that it was being used lawfully.”50 Finally, if information is 
gathered by an intelligence agency, (6) it can only be passed on to 
domestic law enforcement if a factual threshold of suspicion for a 
“serious” offense is met.51 
Compare all of this to the paltry regulation of American mass 
surveillance programs. Many such programs are either not 
authorized by legislation or are authorized by legislation in 
extremely vague terms. For instance, numerous states have 
established fusion centers, which function like mini-metadata 
programs, collecting information from federal, state, and local 
public databases, law enforcement files, and records from private 
companies in an effort to obtain financial-transaction data, credit 
reports, car-rental data, utility payments, vehicle identification 
numbers, and phone numbers.52 Yet most of these states have not 
explicitly authorized these centers, and in others the relevant 
statute merely references the centers without indicating the type of 
information that may be gathered, the purpose for which it may be 
obtained, how long it may be retained, means of ensuring its 
accuracy, or when it may be passed on to officers in the street 
(items 3-6 above).53  
Camera surveillance, drone usage and systemic car tracking systems 
are more likely to be authorized by the relevant legislative body, 
but again often in vague terms that do not address many of the data 
                                                
49 Francesca Bignami, European v. American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of 
AntiTerrorism Datamining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 610-11 (2007). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 41, at 7. 
53 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-601(7)(B)(i) (in the sole reference to fusion centers, 
stating that municipal tax funds may be used to establish “high technology systems that 
collect and share data on criminal activity and historical data with other law enforcement 
agencies, including fusion centers…”). See generally, U.S. SENATE PERMANENT 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN 
STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS (Oct. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report_federal-support-for-and-involvement-
in-state-and-local-fusions-centers (detailing the absence of state regulation of fusion 
centers and the misuse of fusion center funds by the states, and recommending specific 
regulations). The federal government has developed privacy guidelines for fusion centers 
which focus in a very general way on ensuring accuracy of information maintained by the 
centers, but also make clear that it is up to individual fusion centers to devise their own 
regulations, consistent with state law. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES PROTECTION, August 11, 2008, available at http://www.ise.gov/ 
sites/default/files/CR-CL_Guidance_ 08112008.pdf. 
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collection and retention issues that should be addressed.54 At the 
federal level, while the well-known NSA metadata programs do 
have congressional authorization,55 the relevant statute places few 
limitations on the type of information that may be gathered other 
than providing that it be useful in protecting national security.56  
Of particular note is the absence – in virtually every state and until 
recently at the federal level as well – of an independent privacy 
agency charged with monitoring the implementation of these laws 
(item 2 above). According to Bignami, European privacy agencies 
are “policymakers first, enforcers second. . . . Their resources are 
devoted largely to vetting government proposals for 
proportionality and making policy recommendations in the face of 
new technological threats to privacy.”57 These agencies also ensure 
that the public is told about the effect of any laws that are passed.58 
Although the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
reconstituted in 2012, now appears to be fulfilling these roles at the 
federal level, its oversight authority is limited to national security 
operations and the extent of its influence remains to be seen.59 
                                                
54 See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2013 (cameras), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-
fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-cities.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0 (cameras and drones); 
Adam Clark Estes, Why the FAA Isn’t Worried Drones Invading Your Privacy Right Now, 
GIZMODO, Dec. 12, 2014 (drones), available at http://gizmodo.com/why-the-faa-isnt-
worried-about-drones-invading-your-pri-1665794268; Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on 
Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 2104, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779 (car tracking). 
55 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a), (b) & (c) (authorizing the NSA to collect “any tangible thing” that 
is “relevant to an authorized investigated … to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities,” with the authorization to come from the Attorney 
General or his or her delegate).  
56 One knowledgeable commentator has stated that the statute allows “bulk collection” 
of all documents and data related to an authorized inquiry, and that the “inquiry” need 
not focus on a particular crime or suspect, but can instead be a wide-ranging examination 
of a category of wrongdoing, such as international terrorism. David S. Kris, On the Bulk 
Collection of Tangible Things, LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 18-20 available 
at http://www. lawfareblog. com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-
Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf. ). As I have noted, the guidelines promulgated by the National 
Counterterrorism Center in 2012 (since modified by presidential directive in substantial 
ways) allowed the NCTC to “collect, access and retain any piece of information about 
anyone, and hold it for five years.” Christopher Slobogin, The Future of Mass Dossiers, 
JURIST, Apr. 11, 2012, available at http://jurist.org/jurist_search. php? q= Slobogin 
(commenting on GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS, RETENTION, USE, AND DISSEMINATION BY 
THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER AND AGENCIES OF INFORMATION IN 
DATASETS CONTAINING NON-TERRORISM INFORMATION, available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/ 327629/ nctc-
guidelines.pdf).  
57 Bignami, supra note 49, at 685. 
58 Id. at 648 (“The powers of these national and supranational privacy agencies vary, but 
most, including the German and French data protection authorities, have the power to 
review proposed laws and regulations with a data protection impact, to conduct 
inspections of private and public data processors, and to commence administrative 
proceedings against violators which may result in injunctive orders or administrative 
fines.”). 
59 According to its website, the Board is responsible for reviewing executive agency 
actions and legislation, but only in connection with counter-terrorism efforts. See Privacy 
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As I and others have documented, America’s failure to institute 
meaningful oversight of panvasive programs can have concrete 
repercussions, ranging from erroneous targeting because of data 
errors to mission creep.60 Perhaps of most concern, the know-it-all 
state tends to be a state that oppresses, because officials with 
knowledge are tempted to use it in any way they can. Congress 
recognized that fact when it defunded the unfortunately-named 
Total Information Awareness program in 2003, undoubtedly 
influenced by the program’s eerie icon, depicting an all-seeing eye 
atop a pyramid accompanied by the logo “Knowledge [Science] is 
Power.”61 Even the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, no enemy 
of strong law enforcement, was leery of such panvasive 
investigative techniques; as he wrote in 1974 soon after he joined 
the Court, “most of us would feel that . . . a dossier on every citizen 
ought not to be compiled even if manpower were available to do 
it.”62 
As with the targeting issue, there are at least three methods of 
regulating panvasive surveillance. The most draconian is to ban the 
creation and maintenance of databases devoted to ensuring the 
government can develop such dossiers. The opposite extreme is 
the typical American scheme – either non-existent or loose 
authorization that leaves virtually all important decisions about the 
scope and operation of the panvasive system to the executive 
branch. The third, intermediate, position is to adhere to some 
version of what I will call the European approach.  
Relying on John Hart Ely’s political process theory, which posits 
that only laws that are the product of a properly functioning 
                                                
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, http://www.pclob. gov/about-us.html. In 2014, the 
Board determined that the NSA’s metadata program was ultra vires and criticized it on a 
number of grounds consistent with this paper. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE U.S. PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 137 et. seq., Jan. 23 2014, available at 
http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program-
2.pdf. To date, however, Congress has resisted ending that program and, according to the 
Board’s latest report, most of its recommendations have yet to be implemented fully. See 
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, RECOMMENDATION ASSESSMENT 
REPORT 3-15 (Jan. 29, 2015). Numerous federal agencies have privacy officers, but these 
officials do not have the power other administrative agencies have to create and enforce 
rules. Bignami, supra note 49, at 686. The principal enforcement mechanism available to 
these officers is a complaint filed with the Inspector General. See 50 U.S.C. § 3029(c). 
60 Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age? In 
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 11, 19-23 (Jeffrey Rosen 
& Benjamin Wittes, 2011) (detailing the negative consequences of surveillance briefly 
noted in the text); Kim A Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, 
the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 123, 143-59 (2005) 
(describing abuse, slippery slope and chilling concerns). 
61 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.CHI. 
L. REV. 317, 318-19 (2008) (describing the congressional vote and the influence of the 
icon).  
62 William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and 
Effective law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1974). 
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political process should be considered legitimate,63 I have 
contended that the third approach is constitutionally required in 
the U.S.64 More specifically, the legality of panvasive surveillance 
programs should depend foremost on whether they have been 
authorized by a legislative body that is “representative” of the 
affected populace (meaning, ideally, that the law applies to those in 
the legislature and their closest constituents as well as to others).65 
Furthermore, based on what American scholars called the 
nondelegation doctrine, a program’s constitutionality should also 
depend on the degree to which: (1) the law sets forth an “intelligible 
principle” that meaningfully guides the executive branch rather 
than merely delegating all decision-making authority to it; (2) the 
legislature exercises oversight or requires the executive branch to 
do so; (3) the executive agency provides reasons for its 
implementation rules; (4) the rules it establishes are substantively 
reasonable and well-grounded in fact, and (5) the rules are 
developed through a notice-and-comment procedure or similarly 
transparent process (taking into account the need to protect 
investigational methods).66 All of this would be enforceable in 
court.67  
The simplest way of ensuring that these rules are followed in the 
U.S. is to ensure that law enforcement agencies follow the dictates 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that applies to federal 
agencies and of similar statutes in the states.68 Unfortunately, the 
APA has seldom been applied to law enforcement. As a leading 
treatise on the subject states, “administrative law includes the entire 
range of action by government with respect to citizen government 
interaction, except for those matters dealt with by the criminal 
law.”69 One reason for this position, apparently, is that law 
enforcement is thought to be just that – law enforcement – and not 
involved in creating substantive rules like other agencies are. But at 
least when law enforcement engages in programmatic actions like 
panvasive surveillance, they are no longer just enforcing the law. 
Rather they are engaged in policy formation, created by the higher 
ups in the organization, applying to huge segments of the 
population, and responding to general problems rather than a 
                                                
63 See generally, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(1980).  
64 Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014) 
65 Id. at 1733-37 (describing theory and suggesting amendments to it). 
66 Id. at 1758-65 (describing the nondelegation doctrine and its implications for 
surveillance programs). 
67 Id. at 1758-59. Ely subsequently made clear that his theory required legislative 
authorization in national security matters as well. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 54-67 
(1993) (arguing that the courts should consider whether an authorization for the use of 
military force is in response to a war or imminent war, and whether Congress has 
approved the use of force). 
68 The federal Administrative Procedure Act is found at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. 
69 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, J.R., 1 Administrative La Treatise 1 (3d ed. 
1994) (emphasis added) 
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specific incident, as in the usual enforcement scenario.70 In this 
setting, the APA should apply. 
Although they have never said so explicitly, some judicial decisions 
have implicitly recognized this point in the investigative context. 
The Supreme Court has stated that, when warrants are 
impracticable, courts must ensure that there are “reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . 
inspection . . . .”71 As a Utah court stated, “[b]oth warrants and 
statutes originate outside the executive branch, serving to check 
abuses of that branch’s law enforcement power. In the absence of 
either of these checks, leaving authority in the hands of police alone 
is constitutionally untenable.”72Under this doctrine, unless it has a 
warrant, panvasive surveillance programs should not be able to 
operate without the explicit authorization and oversight of 
Congress and in the absence of implementing rules.73 
To make all of this more concrete, consider first how a court 
applying political process theory would analyze an NSA metadata 
surveillance program aimed at American citizens (the following is 
a much truncated version of a comprehensive discussion 
elsewhere74). The court would begin by looking at whether 
Congress has specifically authorized the program; a program 
created solely at the behest of the executive branch would 
immediately be viewed as a violation of separation of powers 
doctrine. Assuming authorizing legislation, the court would 
examine, in a general way, the scope of the program. If it is aimed 
at or has the effect of targeting a politically powerless minority, it 
would be constitutionally suspect.75 If, instead, it contemplates 
gathering data on everyone, it would, perhaps counterintuitively, 
be less vulnerable; if members of Congress pass legislation that will 
affect them and their constituents in addition to others they 
presumably will have internalized the costs as well as the benefits 
of the program. Next, analogous to European law, the court would 
analyze the extent to which the statute creates independent 
oversight of the NSA and gives concrete direction to that agency 
                                                
70 See generally Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Governing the Police, NYU L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
71 Marshal v. Barlow’s, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 320, 323 (1978); see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (“where Congress has authorized inspection but made 
no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the fourth Amendment 
and its various restrictive rules apply.”). 
72 State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
73 A central question, raised by David Cole at the conference, is when an action is 
panvasive and thus triggers process theory’s requirements. For instance, if police decide 
to send a large force into a particular neighborhood, would legislative authorization and 
implementing regulations be required? The answer depends on how many people are 
affected and whether the police action is based on evidence or merely designed to collect 
it. See Slobogin, supra note 22, at 17-18 (definition of general search).  
74 See Slobogin, supra note 64, at 1755-58, 1767-74. 
75 One robust indicator of whether a minority is powerless is whether there is a good 
reason for singling the affected group out for special treatment. Cf. Barry Friedman & 
Cynthia Stein, Two Types of Policing (Two Protections) 67-69 (forthcoming, 2015) (advocating 
for strict scrutiny in such situations). 
 Domestic Surveillance of Public Activities and Transactions with Third Parties: Melding 
European and American Approaches – Christopher Slobogin. 
– 149 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
about the types of data to collect. Finally, it would examine the 
extent to which the NSA develops implementation rules that are 
reasonable and developed through a transparent procedure. This 
last aspect of the analysis would be pre-empted by the Fourth 
Amendment if, contrary to the Supreme Court’s current stance, 
that Amendment applies in the way outlined in the first part of this 
article. Even if the Fourth Amendment does not apply, however, 
the nondelegation aspect of political process theory would allow 
courts to consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances 
described by the five factors listed above, the legislative and 
executive branches have been sufficiently attentive to the demands 
of democracy.  
Political process theory also has implications for American 
attempts to obtain personal data about people who are not residing 
in the United States. As construed by the Supreme Court, the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to aliens who are within the 
United States and have a significant attachment to it.76 However, 
even if this doctrine continues to stand, political process theory 
provides a basis for arguing that aliens outside the country who are 
affected by American law can challenge uneven application of that 
law. As explicated by Ely, process theory entitles citizens from 
other states to the same guarantees enjoyed by citizens within the 
state.77 Although this stance is based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause (which speaks of 
“citizens of the United States”) and the equal protection clause 
(which speaks of persons “within [a state’s] jurisdiction),78 Ely also 
argued that, as a general matter, courts should be particularly 
solicitous of discrimination claims by non-Americans, noting that 
“hostility toward aliens is a time-honored American tradition.”79 
Combining these two positions, it can be argued that even 
foreigners who are not within the United States ought to be 
accorded privacy protection equivalent to that enjoyed by 
American citizens.80 While this protection may not be identical to 
that provided European citizens by their own countries,81 it at least 
                                                
76 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (requiring an individual to 
have a “voluntary attachment” to the United States in order to be one of the “people” 
referenced in the Amendment).  
77 Ely, supra note 63, at 83-84.  
78 The relevant parts of the Fourteenth Amendment read: “No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
… nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
79 Id. at 161. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1548-50 (2d 
ed. 1988) (noting that the Court has required the states to provide strong justification for 
discriminating against aliens within their jurisdiction). 
80 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (“To permit a State to employ the phrase 
‘within its jurisdiction’ in order to identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as 
beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are 
designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the principal purpose 
for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
81 COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH 
REGARD TO AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA, art. 2(a), Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. 
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prevents Congress from passing laws that allow American law 
enforcement and national security agencies to infringe foreigners’ 
civil liberties at will, given the protections afforded American 
citizens.82 That prohibition would nullify those surveillance statutes 
that explicitly provide more protection to United States citizens 
than to foreign citizens outside the country.83 
CONCLUSION 
The hysteria following 9/11 and the ready availability of mass 
surveillance technology have been a potent one-two punch that has 
damaged important civil liberties protecting privacy, autonomy, 
and self-expression. In working through how to respond to the 
resulting government enthusiasm for collecting and analyzing any 
information it can get its hands on, European and American law 
each have something to offer. Specifically, European law provides 
a template for regulating the establishment of technologically-
sophisticated panvasive surveillance systems, and American law 
provides a useful model for rules regulating use of those systems 
to target individuals. This paper has summarized how political 
process theory strengthens the case for European-style rules 
governing programmatic surveillance and how 
proportionality/mosaic theory can improve on the United States’ 
law governing surveillance of individuals.  
                                                
No. (defining “personal data” that is protected as “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual”) (emphasis added). 
82 This position is also consistent with the United Nations’ position. See U.N. HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH REPORT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, para 22, http://justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/UN-ICCPR-Concluding-Observations-USA.pdf 
(concluding that the right to privacy under the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights applies extraterritorially). 
83 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1-5) (permitting warrantless eavesdropping only if the target 
is a non-U.S. person who is not located in the United States).  
